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As concerns about unfairness and discrimination in “black box” machine learning systems 
rise, a legal “right to an explanation” has emerged as a compellingly attractive approach 
for challenge and redress. We outline recent debates on the limited provisions in European 
data protection law, and introduce and analyse newer explanation rights in French 
administrative law and the draft modernised Council of Europe Convention 108. While 
individual rights can be useful, in privacy law they have historically unreasonably 
burdened the average data subject. “Meaningful information” about algosrithmic logics is 
more technically possible than commonly thought, but this exacerbates a new 
“transparency fallacy”—an illusion of remedy rather than anything substantively helpful. 
While rights-based approaches deserve a firm place in the toolbox, other forms of 
governance, such as impact assessments, “soft law”, judicial review and model 
repositories deserve more attention, alongside catalysing agencies acting for users to 
control algorithmic system design. 
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 2 
Introduction 
Businesses and governments are increasingly deploying ML systems to make and support 
decisions which have a crucial impact on everyday life: decisions about (inter alia) criminal 
sentencing and release on bail; medical treatment; eligibility for welfare benefits; what 
entertainment we see and can access; the price and availability of goods and services 
delivered online; and the political information to which we are exposed. These ML systems—
colloquially entering public consciousness as just ‘algorithms’, or even just “AI”—have been 
extensively criticised in the last few years as a result of a number of well known “war stories” 
which have revealed patterns of discrimination embedded but invisible to casual users in such 
systems [5]. Because algorithms are trained on historical data, they risk replicating unwanted 
historical patterns of unfairness and/or discrimination. For example, in hiring systems, a lack of 
women being hired in the past may mean the systems fails to recognise the worth of female 
applicants, or even outright discriminate against them. Luxury goods may be advertised to 
people with certain profiles on social media and not to others, creating a consumer “under 
class”. A severe obstacle to challenging such systems is that outputs, which translate with or 
without human intervention to decisions, are made not by humans or even human-legible 
rules, but by less scrutable mathematical techniques. A loan applicant denied credit by a credit 
scoring ML algorithm cannot easily understand if her data was wrongly entered, or what she 
can do to have a greater chance of acceptance in the future, let alone prove the system is 
illegally discriminating against her (perhaps on race, sex or age). This opacity has been 
described as creating a “black box” society [9]. 
Enter the ‘right to an explanation’ 
Since the 1990s, the law in Europe has been concerned with this kind of opaque, and difficult 
to challenge decision making by automated systems. In consequence, the Data Protection 
Directive (DPD), a measure which harmonised relevant law across EU member states in 1995, 
provided that a “significant” decision could not be solely on based solely on automated data 
processing (art 15). Some EU members interpreted this as a strict prohibition, others as giving 
citizens a right to challenge such a decision and ask for a “human in the loop”. A second right, 
embedded within art 12, which generally gives users rights to obtain information about 
whether and how their particular personal data was processed, gave users the specific right to 
obtain “knowledge of the logic involved in any automatic processing” of their data. Both these 
provisions, but especially the latter were not much noticed, even by lawyers, and scarcely ever 
litigated, but have revived in significance in the latest iteration of EU DP law within the General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which passed in 2016 and will come into operation across 
Europe in 2018. 
In the GDPR, art 15 has been transformed into art 22 and arguably created what the media and 
some technical press have portrayed as a new “right to an explanation” of algorithms. Art 12 
has also been revamped to a new art 15 and now includes a right to access to “meaningful 
information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged 
consequences of such processing” (art 15(1)(h)). This provision, notably, only applies in the 
context of “automated decision making in the context of” art 22. This leaves it unclear if all the 
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constraints on art 22 (discussed below) are ported into art 15 (though our view is that it does 
not). Sadly, all this adds up to a reality considerably foggier than the media portrayal. 
Several factors undermine the idea that art 22 contains a “right to an explanation”. 
Primarily, art 22 does not in its main thrust even contain a “right to an explanation”: merely a 
right to stop processing unless a human is introduced to review the decision on challenge. 
However Art 22 does refer at points to a requirement of “safeguards”, both where the right to 
prevent processing (paradoxically) does not operate, and where it does but sensitive personal 
data is processed. In relation to the first case, “safeguards” are partly listed in art 22(3) but in 
the second case, the only guidance is in recital 71. (“Sensitive” personal data in DP law refers 
to a restricted list of factors regarded as peculiarly important such as health, race, sex, 
sexuality and religious beliefs). 
It is important to note that in European legislation, the articles in the main text are binding on 
member states but are accompanied by recitals, which are designed to help states interpret 
the articles and understand their purpose. Recitals are usually regarded as helpful rather than 
binding, but this is contested and differs among states. Unfortunately, in relation to art 22, 
recital 71 mentions some key matters not included in the main text. Art 22(3) mandates that 
“safeguards” include “at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the 
controller, to express his or her point of view and to contest the decision”, but the safeguards 
listed in recital 71 “should include specific information to the data subject and the right to 
obtain human intervention, to express his or her point of view, to obtain an explanation of the 
decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the decision” [italics added]. 
This strange mishmash of texts thus cannot firmly be said to mandate a right to explanation in 
all or indeed any circumstances and may not be interpreted the same way from state to state. 
This is a serious, but not the only, problem with art 22. 
• Art 22 applies only to systems where decisions are made in a “solely” automated way—i.e. 
there is no “human in the loop”—and there are very few of these and fewer that are 
“significant” (see below). How “meaningful” this input has to be is subject to recent 
regulatory guidance (see [13]), but still unclear. 
• What is a “decision”? The GDPR gives us no help with this at all other than that it includes 
a “measure” (recital 71). Is sending a targeted ad to a user using an algorithmic system a 
“decision”? It produces no binding effect; the advert may be ignored; it is hard to see 
what action causally flows from it in many cases. Yet as in the well-publicised Latanya 
Sweeney example [11], the sending of adverts promoting help with criminal arrests solely 
to “black-sounding” names, was worrying and offensive; and potentially dangerous, if 
these characterisations were then transferred to a system used to mandate and select for 
stop and search, or for airport security. Though a single advert delivery decision might not 
have a significant effect on an individual’s life, the cumulative effect on an entire group or 
class may be worrying. Such “group privacy” impacts are not dealt with well by DP law—
an area based on individualistic human rights—and exacerbated by a continuing lack of 
provision for class actions in EU states. 
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• Art 22 applies only to a decision that produces legal or other “significant” effects. This is 
vague in the extreme. Some would argue this could only apply to systems which make 
important, binding decisions on things like criminal justice, risk assessment, credit 
scoring, education applications or employment. Yet such systems are rarely if ever 
entirely automated, even if the human’s involvement is often nominal. Furthermore some 
commercial decisions may seem trivial as a one-off, but significant in aggregate. Mendoza 
and Bygrave argue that advertising decisions can never be significant [6] which does not 
seem unreasonable. But is a system recommending buying choices, or targeting adverts 
not significant if over time it limits a user’s worldview or choices? What about one which 
disseminates “fake news” via algorithmic filter bubbles? Arguably, such phenomena are 
becoming deeply destructive to our democracy. We have an obvious link here to the issue 
of to whom a decision needs to be “significant”: the individual in question, or society as a 
whole? 
Turning to new art 15 of the GDPR (right to information), this right, to “meaningful information 
about the logic involved” in any decision-making system may be more useful than art 22. It is 
(arguably) not directly as restricted as art 22 is to “solely” automated decisions having 
“significant” or legal effects. But there is an unresolved doubt about whether it only applies to 
information available before the system makes a decision about a particular data subject (see 
Wachter et al. [14]). In ML parlance, that means it is uncertain if the right is only to a general 
explanation of the model of the system as a whole (“model-based explanation”), rather than 
an explanation of how a decision was made based on that particular data subject’s particular 
facts (“subject-based” explanation) [5]. 
But even if we agree that art 15 may give us some kind of functioning right to an explanation, 
we still have huge problems. The GDPR can only apply where decisions are made based on 
personal data. Personal data is defined in art 4(1), as “any information relating to an identified 
or identifiable natural person” and is certainly wider than data which has the name of a data 
subject attached to it. According to recital 26: 
“To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the 
means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another 
person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly.” 
Even allowing for this broad (and, still, controversial) approach to defining personal data, it is 
clear some data will be anonymous and so not fall within the scope of the GDPR. Yet 
algorithmic decisions which affect people may not involve personal data. The most obvious 
example is self-driving cars. They may kill people – passengers or pedestrians – as a result of 
algorithmic processing, yet the data involved in that decision may be entirely related to traffic, 
road conditions and other non-personal matters. Other circumstances may involve data that 
was once personal, but has been allegedly anonymised. This is very common, e.g., with profiles 
made from personal data collected by social networks and used to generate targeted 
marketing.  
Thirdly and lastly, a final restriction to these rights comes in the form of a carve-out in recital 
63 (though not main text) for intellectual property (IP) and trade secrets. Explanations of how 
an algorithm works might reveal a firm’s competitive advantage—its notorious “secret sauce”. 
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Although this should not result in a “refusal to provide all information to the data subject”, the 
lack of clear-cut provisions will likely continue to further muddy the waters. It is sometimes 
possible however to devise explanations of systems which do not need access to the 
proprietary innards of an ML model using “pedagogical” or “model-agnostic” methods [10, 12]. 
Improving the “right to an explanation” after the GDPR 
Above, we have seen how the right to an explanation as we find it in the GDPR appears far from 
ideal. This is hardly surprising given that the provisions are still largely modelled on the 1995 
Directive, which itself effectively predated the Internet and modern algorithm design.  
More modern laws exist: one example is the French loi pour une République numérique (Digital 
Republic Act, Loi n 2016-1321) which gives a right to an explanation for administrative 
algorithmic decisions made about individuals. The new law provides that in the case of [author 
translation] “a decision taken on the basis of an algorithmic treatment”, the rules that define 
that treatment and its “principal characteristics” must be communicated upon request. Further 
details were added by decree in March 2017 (R311-3-1-2) elaborating that the administration 
shall provide information about: 
1. the degree and the mode of contribution of the algorithmic processing to the 
decision-making; 
2. the data processed and its source; 
3. the treatment parameters, and where appropriate, their weighting, applied to the 
situation of the person concerned; 
4. the operations carried out by the treatment. 
Some areas of government, such as national security and defence, are excluded. 
The French approach has important advantages over the GDPR. First, looking at point 1, a 
decision is not, it seems, excluded from the right because it is only partly made by an 
algorithm. 
Secondly, point 3 provides that where appropriate the weightings of factors in a system can be 
disclosed. This seems to imply the decision must be of a particular decision (“subject-based” 
explanation) rather than a vague overview of a complex model (“model-based” explanation), 
contradicting the interpretation by Wachter et al. [14]. Extracting estimates of the weightings 
within a complex algorithm is increasingly possible, particularly if only the area “local” to the 
query is being considered [10], which unlike the complex innards of the entire network, might 
display recognisable patterns [7]. 
Weights may help explain systems, but they are by no means a complete fast track to 
interpretability. There are at least two occasions when a court might say that weights are not 
useful for explaining a decision to a human user and therefore it is not “appropriate” to order 
disclosure. These are when the weighted inputs do not map to any real world features the user 
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will find intelligible, and, in older or restricted systems, where retrofitting an explanation 
system is unfeasible. 
On the downside, the new French right applies only to administrative decisions. This makes its 
advances more comprehensible, for several reasons. Firstly, the number of discretionary 
decisions currently made by governmental algorithmic systems is relatively small compared to 
the increasing amount of ML profiling in the private/commercial sector. Secondly, there is a 
long established constitutional expectation that democratic governments will, to some extent, 
be transparent—e.g.  via freedom of information (FOI) requests. By contrast the private sector 
is usually not required to disclose its secrets except on limited occasions such as financial 
disclosures.  
Another new instrument in the planning is the modernisation of the Council of Europe 
Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data (“CoE 108”). CoE 108 is an international treaty relating to DP which, regardless 
of its name, can be signed by any state in the world. Its membership however remains 
relatively limited e.g. not currently including either the US or China. 
In a recently circulated draft, it appeared that the CoE was considering as one alternative, a 
version of the “right to an explanation” for all automated decisions, without the restriction of 
art 22, GDPR. This would be an exciting development. While the outcomes of the CoE 
negotiations are far from settled, interestingly it seems this potentially expanded CoE right has 
already been ported to the draft UK transposition of the GDPR, the Data Protection Bill 2017 
(see https://perma.cc/X7X6-TXW9). The Bill is oddly drafted but, in brief, the first two parts of the 
Bill reflect EU law since they transpose both the GDPR and the new EU Directive relating to DP 
in policing matters (Directive (EU) 2016/680). The third part of the Bill however applies DP law 
to UK intelligence services. These are outside of EU law, but the UK has chosen to make these 
provisions compliant, not with the GDPR but the draft modernised CoE. As a result the draft 
Bill’s s96 currently contains one of the most advanced provisions on a right to explanation in 
the world! Before too much excitement is generated, however, it should be noted that any 
disclosures will still be controlled by overarching exemptions for national security in draft s108 
and s109, and so are in fact never likely to be exercised. 
Is a ‘right to an explanation’ the best remedy we can 
have? 
The ‘right to an explanation’ is only one tool for scrutinising, challenging and restraining 
algorithmic decision making. While it has rhetorical strength in demanding transparency to 
enable user challenge, it has serious practical and conceptual flaws. 
First, reliance on an explanation to bolster individual rights places a primary and heavy onus on 
users to challenge bad decisions. Even ordinary DP subject access requests (SARs) demand an 
enormous amount of time and persistence and in reality are mainly used effectively only by 
journalists and insiders who know how the company in question organises its data processing 
systems. Very few ordinary users historically make use of SARs and still less will probably use 
the right to an explanation. These issues are abetted by the common problems of consumer 
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access to justice, including a general lack of access to legal aid, and, in the EU, to class actions 
or collective redress. As noted below, users are supposed to be represented by their state Data 
Protection Authorities (DPAs) in Europe—but in reality this support may be lacking due to a lack 
of manpower and expertise in these bodies.  
Second, an explanation even if obtained may not be helpful in mounting a challenge. This may 
not be just because of the well-known difficulties about expressing machine logic in human 
comprehensible form [5]; despite the progress that is being made in overcoming the hurdles to 
producing “meaningful information” about algorithmic logic. But algorithmic models, inputs 
and weightings, however disclosed, may still not show that a system has been designed to be 
biased, unfair, or deceptive. Most algorithms will display inadvertent bias rather than explicitly 
coded-in bias: designers will not want to be sued or prosecuted for illegal action even if their 
own ethics do not forbid it. Researchers are discovering now how difficult many of these 
problematic but non-obvious issues can be to spot even when they have the whole dataset to 
hand. Biased or discriminatory behaviour may only become apparent looking at the corpus of 
users as a whole—something which will not happen through individual user challenges. 
It might be possible to better understand these aspects of a model as a whole if many 
individuals could utilise their individual rights to explanation at once. This would require ideally 
far better legal and technical mechanisms for collective action and challenge than we have 
now. At the moment even gathering information about the collective impact of algorithmic 
systems on users is difficult and unusual. A good example is the sending of “dark ads” to 
voters during recent political campaigns via political profiling of voters on social media 
platforms. Because these adverts were personally targeted to users, outside agencies could 
not even know what ads were being deployed less still count them or their influence. “Dark 
ads” during the 2016 British general election were tracked to some extent by volunteers who 
installed and browsed the internet with the WhoTargetsMe tool, but naturally this counting was 
very partial and non-representative. Given the already weighty burden on the individual, also 
requiring them to coordinate collective action to expose unfair algorithms seems unlikely to 
succeed. 
In short, a legal right to an explanation may be a good place to start but it is by no means the 
end of the story. Rights become dangerous things if they are unreasonably hard to exercise, or 
ineffective in results, because they give the illusion that “something has been done” while in 
fact things are no better. It is instructive here to compare the history of consent to sharing of 
data, which has moved in the online world from a real bulwark of privacy to something most 
often described as “meaningless” or “illusory.” Consent is usually given via privacy policies 
which are largely never read, and if read not understood; cannot be negotiated and change 
from time to time. Thus consent has become a formality validating the actions of the data 
controller rather than something empowering the user. This is sometimes known as the 
“notice and choice fallacy”. It would be worrying and dangerous to see the “right to an 
explanation” become a similar empty formality. This “transparency fallacy” is something we 
should both guard against and which should spur us on, as in the next section, to look at 
alternative and supplementary ways to build better systems. 
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In particular any remedy given by a right to an explanation will often come too late for that 
particular user. The current investigations into automated recidivism decisions in the US 
biased against black data subjects show very clearly a history of discrimination for years which 
is only now becoming apparent. In many cases, we would rather the system was never broken 
in first place, or at very least that the individual decision concerned swung in a more just 
direction. This takes us to a range of ex ante as well as ex post governance tools. 
In the next sections, we begin to consider what other regulatory tools have been created in the 
GDPR and elsewhere which might be pressed into use to try to assure, audit or instigate the 
creation of algorithms which are fairer, less discriminatory and, ideally, also less opaque. 
Investigating before the system is built 
Privacy by design, data protection by design and impact 
assessments 
The GDPR introduces a number of new provisions which, rather radically, do not confer 
individual rights, but rather attempt to create an environment in which less “toxic” automated 
systems will be built in future. These ideas come out of the long evolution of “privacy by 
design” (PbD) engineering as a way to build privacy-aware or privacy-friendly systems, 
generally in a voluntary rather than mandated way. They recognise that a regulator cannot do 
everything by top down control, but that controllers must themselves be involved in the design 
of less privacy-invasive systems. These provisions include requirements that: 
• controllers must, at the time systems are developed as well as at the time of actual 
processing, implement “appropriate technical and organisational measures” to protect 
the rights of data subjects (GDPR, art 25). In particular, “data protection by default” is 
required so that only personal data necessary for processing are gathered. Suggestions 
for PbD include making use of pseudonymisation and data minimisation; 
• when a type of processing using “new” technologies is “likely to result in a high risk” to 
the rights of data subjects, then there must be a prior Data Protection Impact Assessment 
(DPIA) (art 35); 
• every public authority and every “large scale” private sector controller and any controller 
who processes the “special” categories of data under art 9 (sensitive personal data) must 
appoint a Data Protection Officer (DPO) (art 37). 
DPIAs especially have tremendous implications for ML design. Impact assessments are tools 
used in many domains to assess or estimate impacts of particular interventions or courses of 
action. GDPR, art 35 notes that: 
“Where a type of processing in particular using new technologies [...] is likely to result in a 
high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller shall, prior to the 
processing, carry out an assessment of the impact of the envisaged processing operations on 
the protection of personal data”. 
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Where a DPIA “indicates that the processing would result in a high risk in the absence of 
measures taken by the controller to mitigate the risk”, the controller is obliged to “consult [the 
data protection authority] prior to processing” (art. 36(1)) with a view to putting in measurers 
to mitigate the risk. Realistically, this seems only likely in cases of highly novel technologies or 
the use of existing technology in a new context; DPIAs are not intended as a tool to stop 
processing, but rather as a way to refine, or provide points of accountability for the future 
operation of, complex systems. 
The Article 29 Working Party (A29 WP) (a body made up of national DP supervisory authorities 
which gives authoritative but not binding recommendations on how to interpret DP laws—soon 
to be revamped as the European Data Protection Board) has issued draft guidance (17/EN WP 
248) further elaborating the conditions under which a data controller must carry out a DPIA. 
These include if two or more of the following conditions are met as part of processing: 
• Evaluation or scoring of individuals; 
• Automated decision-making with legal or similar significant effect; 
• Systematic monitoring, including of a public area; 
• Sensitive data processing, as defined in the GDPR; 
• Data processed on a large scale; 
• Matched or combined datasets, particularly if data subjects might have had different 
expectations about their use; 
• Data concerning vulnerable data subjects; 
• Innovative use of technological or organisational solutions; 
• Data transfer outside the EU; 
• Processing that prevents rights being exercised, such as in a public area people cannot 
avoid, or as a necessary prerequisite to service provision. 
Taken together with the GDPR, this guidance indicates that a DPIA will be an obligatory 
precursor for many ML systems with sizeable anticipated risks or consequences for individuals 
or groups. 
DPIAs are not a replacement for explanations of algorithmic systems, not least because they 
are aimed at helping builders and regulators, not, directly, users (although art 35(9) does 
provide that “where appropriate, the controller shall seek the views of data subjects”.) DPIAs 
are also not required to be public documents, although it is considered good practice by the 
A29 WP to do so at least in part. However they may be of considerable value in leading to the 
building of better systems overall. 
Arts 35 and 36 do not specifically require a DPIA to combat potential discrimination: early 
drafts made a DPIA mandatory where there was a “risk of discrimination being embedded in or 
reinforced by the operation” [1]. This amendment in the final text was relegated to recitals (see 
Recitals 71 and 75), which as discussed, have a murky status in EU law. However in its draft 
guidance, the A29 WP explicitly clarified that “rights and freedoms” in art. 35(1) “may also 
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involve other fundamental rights such as [...] prohibition of discrimination”. The UK’s 
Information Commissioner’s Office (the ICO), in their influential guidance report on Big data, 
artificial intelligence, machine learning and data protection [8] note firmly that “potential 
privacy risks” have already been identified with “the use of inferred data and predictive 
analytics” and go on to provide a draft DPIA for big data analytics (Annex 1). It seems clear 
that, despite the uncertainty of the “high risk” threshold, DPIAs are quite likely to become the 
required norm for algorithmic systems, especially where sensitive personal data, such as race 
or political opinion, is processed on a “large scale” (GDPR, art 35(3)(b)). 
Impact assessments that deal with risks of discrimination do already exist. The UK has 
extensive experience with Equality Impact Assessments (EqIAs), which used to be required for 
every new governmental policy, and were considered one of the main ways of documenting 
fulfilment of the Public Sector Equality Duty, itself brought into law by the Equality Act 2010. 
The Public Sector Equality Duty requires due regard to be given to impacts on protected 
classes before a policy is finalised or implemented, and it primarily accessed through judicial 
review. This requirement does not always need to be met via an EqIA (see R (Brown) v Sec of 
State for Work and Pensions 2008 EWHC 3158 (Admin)), but must be carried out with rigour 
before a policy is implemented, with documentation to show the process if it is not otherwise 
clear. Arguably, where new public sector decision support systems are built, an EqIA would be 
highly appropriate and could be combined with the DPIA process. 
Certification systems 
The GDPR also introduces the idea of voluntary certification for ML systems. Article 42 
proposes voluntary certification of controllers and processors to demonstrate compliance with 
the Regulation, with “certification mechanisms” and the development of “seals and marks” to 
be encouraged by EU member states. In the UK, a tender has already been advertised by the 
ICO for a certification authority to run a UK privacy seal, although progress has been 
interrupted by the vote to exit the European Union, and the subsequent political turmoil. 
Taken together, these provisions offer exciting opportunities to operationalise what in the US 
have been called “big data due process” rights [3, 4]. Certification could be applied to two 
main aspects of algorithmic systems: 
1. certification of the algorithm as a software object by 
1. directly specifying either its design specifications or the process of its design, 
such as the expertise involved (“technology-based standards”) and/or 
2. specifying output-related requirements that can be monitored and evaluated 
(“performance-based standards”); 
2. certification of the whole person or process using the system (“system controller”) to 
make decisions, which would consider algorithms as situated in the context of their 
use. 
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One notable advantage is that certification standards could be set on a per-sector basis. This is 
already very common in other socio-technical areas, such as environmental sustainability 
standards. 
The downside of what seems an exciting approach is that the history in the privacy domain of 
self-regulation of the private sector by seal and certificates is dispiriting. Essentially this 
involves privatisation of regulation and scrutiny. Certification scheme and trust seals have to 
make money to survive, which can only be obtained by asking fees from members. Given this 
self-interest, it is hard to punish members too hard when they breach the rules of the seal or 
certificate, for fear they will leave, either altogether or for a less demanding trust seal (in a 
plural market, which is generally what is envisaged). This in turn tends to diminish the value of 
the seal or certificate as a guarantee of trustworthiness. There is also little proof users regard 
seals and certificates as indicators of trust which may mean organisations are unwilling to pay 
or make an effort to belong to them, unless by doing so they can avoid more stringent “top 
down” regulation. 
The clear worked example here is the US–EU “Safe Harbor” agreement for the export of 
personal data to the US which came ignominiously to an end in Schrems v DPC of Ireland in the 
CJEU in 2015 (Case C-362/14). The US as a country had been deemed not to have “adequate” 
protection in its law for personal data, and so in principal, EU data could not be exported to the 
US as far back as the DPD in 1995. A solution was found however in the “Safe Harbor” 
agreement whereby US companies could receive EU data if they joined a trust seal, 
membership of which guaranteed they were meeting adequate privacy standards. One of the 
largest and most prominent seals used in this way was TrustE. Yet as Charlesworth showed 
back in 2000 [2], TrustE had a long history of overlooking major data breaches by members or 
imposing only desultory sanctions. This, as well as the US’s own cavalier attitude to covert 
state surveillance exposed in the Snowden revelations, lead to the agreement’s judicial 
annulling. 
Enabling review and challenge after a system is built 
Representation bodies for data subjects 
The aim of a right to an explanation is fundamentally to enable challenge to poor or wrongly 
made decisions by “black box” systems. Yet, as we have seen, individual users typically 
struggle to assert their rights, especially in complex and opaque areas such as ML systems. 
Moreover, if we are talking about a harm such as embedded systemic discrimination which 
typically affects a whole class of people, then it may seem far more appropriate for a 
representative body to accept and mount challenges than each individual user. This is a 
common problem in consumer law, and was long anticipated in DP law by the creation of state 
DPAs, which already have a role to investigate user complaints and enforce breaches against 
data controllers. One historic problem here has been the low level of sanctions a DPA could 
dish out: this has famously been met in the GDPR by the creation of a maximum fine of up to 
EUR 20 million or 4% of global annual turnover. This welcome change does not alter the fact 
however that the volume of DP breaches both deliberate and inadvertent is now so huge that 
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one agency alone cannot combat it. Furthermore, state DPAs throughout the EU are wildly 
underfunded, since in their nature (and by law), they have to be seen to be independent of both 
state and the commercial sector. A final major problem germane to ML-related complaints is 
that DPAs are typically staffed by civil servants and/or lawyers and rarely have much technical 
understanding or capacity. 
The GDPR tries to help here in two main ways. Article 80(1) provides for all member states that 
a data subject can mandate a third body to lodge a complaint, exercise the right to judicial 
remedy and to receive compensation on his or her behalf. This is a useful step, particularly if 
civil society bodies can find an exemplary case to support: but it still requires a data subject to 
notice a breach, and have the time and effort to reach out to a third body and enlist their help. 
Given a third body can receive compensation on behalf of a data subject, this might also result 
in a dubious “ambulance chasing” industry (similar to the UK furore over wrongly paid payment 
protection insurance, or PPI). 
Article 80(2), GDPR, by contrast, permits member states to allow third party bodies to take up 
complaints, for example against a data controller, without being mandated by a data subject. 
Through this provision, civil society bodies could monitor sectors and controllers for breaches 
and pursue suspected infringements of their own accord through judicial remedies. 
Article 80(1) is mandatory for GDPR-implementing states to put into law, while Article 80(2) is 
not. While Germany looks to have implemented this, the UK’s daft Data Protection Bill 2017 
(thus far) does not. This seems odd, given the UK has already nominated ‘super-complaint’ 
NGOs that can, for example raise consumer or financial rights issues to regulators on behalf of 
groups they perceive as affected. 
Bodies like this might become effective watchdogs in particular areas or sectors, but they will 
find it difficult to do this without having the capability for some access in the round to training 
data, input data, outputs and models of algorithmic systems in order to establish whether 
breaches are occurring. A large problem here is that courts have typically been reluctant to 
order access to source code for decision making systems even in relation to traditional non 
algorithmic systems. This is of course partly because of the issue of proprietary IP rights in 
code already noted above (see e.g. Viacom v YouTube Civ. 2103 (LL) in the US) but other issues 
may also be implicated. 
In the UK there appears to be no reported case where a court has ordered disclosure of the 
source code of a decision support system to litigants, even in the surprisingly high number of 
disputes involving public sector systems, where issues of copyright might have been thought 
to be less prominent. It is interesting though that in at least one case, Northern Metco Estates 
Ltd v Perth & Kinross District Council 1993 S.L.T. (Lands Tr) 28, the output of a conventional 
though complex automated decision support system was doubted in respect to its value 
without more information as to how it was generated. The system in question calculated one 
factor (“economic rent”) to feed into a compensation valuation in cases of compulsory 
acquisition of land. The court was disturbed at the lack of evidence they received as to exactly 
how this calculation had been done, but, interestingly, did not seem interested to find out more 
but rather to exclude it from influence. It seems quite likely that courts will be reluctant to 
become activist about disclosures of source code let alone algorithmic training sets and 
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models until they feel more confident of their ability to comprehend and use such evidence—
which may take some time. 
This likely judicial reluctance to become involved in unpicking algorithmic systems is 
unfortunate because at least in the public sector, a very valuable tool towards transparency 
might be found in the institution of judicial review. In the UK courts have the power on petition 
to review if administrative acts and discretion were legal and reasonable. In principle there 
seems no reason why the court’s powers in such review might not extend to demanding access 
to data and models. However as noted above there is as yet no record of this having been 
done. This may be down to a combination of proprietary code issues and technophobia but 
there may also be worries about exposing sensitive personal data to the public eye (court 
documents are usually public). 
One way forward here may be drawn from developing practice around sensitive public sector 
data and access to it by non-governmental data analysts. In recent years, much work has been 
done into building methods by which sensitive data can be accessed and analysed securely, 
proportionally and safely. National statistics offices have been working on ways to enable 
access to these rich troves of information to external data analysts without compromising 
security and privacy. Although several methods have been used here, the most interesting for 
our purposes is the development of secure environments for access to sensitive data. These 
locations are usually disconnected from a network and may be physically located in a public 
agency, private company or increasingly in academia. 
We imagine that such systems might scale to become depositories for the scrutiny of the 
models and data associated with public sector algorithmic systems. Challenges to private 
sector systems might also benefit from such systems, albeit with IP issues to overcome. 
Archival or specialist libraries may yet become homes for infrastructure to publicly scrutinise 
models and code, just as they already often act as code escrow agencies. 
Conclusions 
In this article, we addressed the challenges of algorithmic systems which appear to deliver 
biased, discriminatory, unfair or opaque decisions and the rise of the “right to an explanation” 
as a possible legal remedy. We explored the limits of the right to an explanation in the GDPR, 
as well as in legislation drafted subsequently. 
As things stands, the “right to an explanation” found in the GDPR, though beguiling, is 
uncertain, convoluted, rife with technical difficulties, and likely to be interpreted differently in 
different member states. There are key restrictions in the remedies it gives which are likely to 
exclude the decision support systems where transparency would be most welcomed: in crucial 
sectors such as criminal justice, policing, and child protection where decisions are not “solely” 
based on automated processing. As a rights based remedy, it places a large burden on 
individual users to not only seek their own explanations but follow up with challenges. It also 
does not work well as a remedy for harms experienced in aggregate by groups or protected 
classes. There is a danger the hype around the “right to an explanation” may create the belief 
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there is no need for further legal and non-legal solutions. Some newer legal instruments such 
as the new French law, offer refinements to the GDPR, but may also add their own restrictions. 
Accordingly we proposed a wider sweep of attention towards other legal and para-legal 
remedies which may also have scope to impel the creation of better and more scrutable 
algorithmic systems. These include privacy by design, Data Protection Impact Assessments, 
and certification or seal schemes, all of which might offer scrutiny during the process of 
building systems rather than merely after they cause harm. We also suggested that redress for 
users after a system has caused harm could be improved by taking the opportunities the GDPR 
gives for representation and collective action by non-governmental bodies. Finally we noted 
that access to source code and data of algorithms will remain both a practical issue for NGOs 
as well as in contested legal cases for as long as courts are reluctant to order its disclosure, 
and suggested secure model depositories might help in this area. 
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